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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
At issue in this appeal is an Immigration Judge‟s 
ruling, affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals, that 
the appellant, Quao Lin Dong, failed to meet her burden of 
proof in relation to her claim of past persecution set forth in 
her Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal.  
The finding was based on Dong‟s failure to secure her 
husband‟s testimony or affidavit explaining a fact contained 
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in his asylum application that was inconsistent with Dong‟s 
claim and testimony.  The IJ and the BIA found that 
corroboration was required and not provided, relying on the 
precedent we established in Abdulai v. Ashcroft,  239 F.3d 
542 (3d Cir. 2001).   We disagree and will remand to the BIA 
for further consideration consistent with this opinion.  At the 
same time, we will affirm the BIA‟s ruling that Dong‟s claims 
for relief based on future persecution and under the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) must fail.  
 
Background 
 
 On May 19, 2000, Quao Lin Dong, a Chinese national, 
entered the United States at or near Boston, Massachusetts 
without valid entry documents.  Dong was detained by the 
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(“INS”) shortly thereafter.  On June 6, 2000, the INS issued a 
Notice to Appear, charging Dong with removability from the 
United States pursuant to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) as an alien who, at 
the time of application of admission, was not in possession of 
“a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border 
crossing identification card, or other valid entry document.”  
8 U.S.C. § 1182(7)(A)(i)(I).  On February 9, 2001, Dong filed 
an Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, 
also later construed as an application for protection under 
Article III of CAT.  Dong claimed that she feared return to 
China on account of past persecution by the Chinese 
authorities pursuant to China‟s one-child family planning 
policy.  On December 3, 2007, after numerous continuances, 
Dong testified at a merits hearing in support of her 
application.         
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 Dong‟s testimony recounted her life in China and her 
alleged persecution at the hands of Chinese officials.  She was 
born in China on November 2, 1967, and was later married to 
Le Ju Jian.  On November 3, 1991, Dong gave birth to the 
first of their three children, a girl.  In 1992, following the 
birth of her daughter, Dong was forced to have an intrauterine 
device, or IUD, inserted for birth-control purposes.  Dong 
described her husband being forcibly subdued while she was 
dragged from her home to have the procedure performed 
against her will.  Dong‟s husband subsequently fled China, 
hoping to obtain legal status in the United States with the 
intention of bringing Dong and their daughter Stateside.       
 
 In 1995, Dong fell ill from the IUD and later had it 
removed.  Jian rejoined Dong in China to care for her from 
April to June 1996, thereafter returning to the United States.  
While her husband was in China, Dong became pregnant.  In 
January 1997, when Dong was seven months pregnant, family 
planning officials visited Dong‟s house.  They told her that 
they knew of her pregnancy and that China‟s family planning 
policy prohibited her from having a second child.  Dong was 
taken to another location, where she was given an injection 
and put into a cell.  While in the cell, Dong went into labor.  
She was then taken to Guantow Health Hospital, where she 
gave birth to a still-born child. 
 
 Approximately one month later, Dong was instructed 
by the family planning officials to report to have another IUD 
inserted.  Dong appeared for the insertion appointment, but 
she was still experiencing bleeding.  After examining her, the 
doctor stated that she could not be fitted for the IUD at that 
time.  Dong was told to report for a second attempt at 
insertion in April 1997.  She was cautioned by the doctor that 
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if the second attempt at insertion proved unsuccessful, she 
would be forced to submit to a procedure that would result in 
her sterilization.  Instead of taking this chance, Dong fled.  
She went into hiding, moving into her cousin‟s house which 
was located about two hours from her home.  During this 
time, Dong was advised by her mother-in-law that the family 
planning authorities had come to her house and continued to 
look for Dong after she had fled.  While in hiding, Dong 
made arrangements to join her husband in the United States.  
Dong left China in March 1999. 
 
 While in the United States, awaiting the completion of 
the related administrative proceedings, Dong gave birth to 
two more children.  On August 11, 2001, in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, Dong gave birth to a girl.  Less than a year 
later, on July 27, 2002, Dong gave birth to a third child, a 
boy.  Dong‟s oldest child remains in China.  The two younger 
children live in the United States with Dong and her husband.           
 
 Dong offered several pieces of evidence to corroborate 
her testimony.  Aside from the filing documents, initial 
interview transcripts, and a few other pieces of evidence 
offered to describe her life in the United States and the births 
of her three children, Dong offered three United States 
Department of State country reports to support her claim of 
fear of future persecution.  Dong also offered letters authored 
by her mother-in-law and a relative, both of whom live in 
China, which buttress, in detail, her testimony as to past 
persecution.  Specifically, her mother-in-law‟s letter gives an 
account of the events, and turmoil, that surrounded the 
insertion of IUDs and the alleged forced abortion, as well as 
Dong‟s flight into hiding.  The relative‟s letter simply states 
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that Dong did live with him from 1997 through 1999 to avoid 
family planning officials.   
 
Dong also offered medical records to reflect the events 
described in her testimony.  Documentation of quarterly 
gynecological exams required by the Chinese government 
were offered to show the extent of the family planning policy.  
Medical records from Temple University Hospital in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, from 2001 and 2002, were 
produced to show that Dong had discussed the abortion she 
was forced to undergo in China in 1997 with her doctors 
when seeking medical treatment here in the United States.  
Dong also offered a Special Disease Certificate from 
Guantow Central Community Hospital stating that she was 
seven months pregnant and had undergone an induced 
abortion at the facility.  However, this was challenged by the 
government, who in rebuttal, offered a Department of 
Homeland Security report that claimed the certificate was 
fraudulent.  This conclusion was based on a statement by an 
official at Guantow Hospital, made to consular officials as 
part of an investigation, claiming that the certificate was 
fraudulent because there was no doctor with the name on the 
certificate working at the hospital.  Dong in turn challenged 
the DHS report by offering a letter from Michael Pellerin, 
Director of the Political Asylum Research and Documentation 
Service, LLC, asserting that the shortcomings of DHS‟s 
investigative methodology made its report unreliable.  
Pellerin highlighted the failure to research human resource 
records or other concrete documentation in arriving at the 
conclusion that the certificate was fraudulent.  The DHS 
report itself discusses the difficulty of securing accurate 
information from the hospital.  Specifically, the report stated 
that “the office does not keep any records of the certificates 
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having been issued … [,] the personnel of the office have 
been constantly changing … [, and] [s]ignature verification is 
also not easy to conduct.”   
 
Additionally, the record contained Dong‟s husband 
Jian‟s asylum application.  Jian stated in his 1992 asylum 
claim that Dong was forced to undergo an abortion by family 
planning officials in 1992, while Dong had testified that the 
IUD was inserted in 1992 and the forced abortion occurred in 
1997.  When the government questioned Dong about this 
conflict, she expressed surprise, claiming to have only learned 
of this for the first time at her merits hearing.  Dong offered 
no explanation of the inconsistency created by her husband‟s 
asylum claim, except for the comment, “he does not talk a lot 
and I did not ask.”  Dong did produce her husband‟s parole 
and travel documents to corroborate his travel to China in 
1996, but she offered no live testimony or affidavit from her 
husband to resolve this factual discrepancy.        
 
The IJ summarized the proceedings as a simple 
abortion case, requiring the IJ to find Dong credible in her 
testimony and persuasive in her request for discretionary 
relief.  At the outset of his analysis, the IJ was perplexed by 
the absence of Dong‟s husband during the hearing, so much 
so that, after finding that Dong “largely testified consistent 
with the claim,” the IJ held that Dong nonetheless failed to 
meet her burden of proof because the evidence she presented 
lacked specific corroboration in the form of her husband‟s 
testimony to resolve the discrepancy in dates referred to 
above.  The IJ opined that the conflict between Dong‟s 
asylum claim and her husband‟s claim created enough doubt 
to make it reasonable for the IJ to expect this specific form of 
corroboration.  Despite this request, Dong did not produce the 
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requested corroboration, stating that her husband was under 
an exclusion order – presumably to explain why it would be 
unreasonable to expect him to appear and testify.  Dong 
argued that the record evidence she had produced was 
sufficient to corroborate her claim.  The IJ did not consider 
what had been produced, as such, but, relying on Abdulai, 
required corroboration in the form of the husband‟s testimony 
or affidavit regarding the discrepancy in order for Dong to 
meet her burden of proof.  Accordingly, he denied Dong 
asylum. 
 
In addition, the IJ held that Dong failed to make the 
required showing necessary to justify asylum based on a well-
founded fear of future persecution, withholding of removal, 
or relief under CAT.  Dong appealed to the BIA, which in 
affirming the IJ‟s ruling, adopted his reasoning and dismissed 
the appeal.  
 
Jurisdiction, Standard Of Review, 
And Dong‟s Burden Of Proof 
 
 The BIA had jurisdiction over Dong‟s appeal from the 
IJ‟s determination pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1.  We have 
jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252. 
 
 Dong‟s appeal arises from the BIA‟s determination; 
however, we have held that when the BIA has affirmed the 
IJ‟s decision, and adopted the analysis as its own, we will 
review both decisions.  See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 
246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Because the IJ‟s corroboration 
discussion and determinations are affirmed and partially 
reiterated in the BIA's decision, we review them along with 
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the BIA decision.”).  Therefore, we will review the IJ‟s and 
BIA‟s findings of fact to determine whether they are 
supported by substantial evidence.  Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 
F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We affirm any findings of fact 
supported by substantial evidence and are „bound by the 
administrative findings of fact unless a reasonable adjudicator 
would be compelled to arrive at a contrary conclusion.‟”) 
(quoting Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 421(3d Cir. 
2005)).  We review the IJ‟s and BIA‟s legal determinations de 
novo.  Toussaint v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 
2006).  If we take issue with the application of law to Dong‟s 
case, we will defer to the authority granted an agency by 
Congress and remand to the BIA for the appropriate 
consideration.  I.N.S. v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002).   
 
  Dong bears the burden of proof in her claim for relief.  
For Dong to qualify for the discretionary relief of asylum, she 
must establish that she satisfies the definition of “refugee” 
within the meaning established by Section 101(a)(42) of the 
INA.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  A refugee is defined by the 
INA as “any person who is outside any country of such 
person's nationality … and who is unable or unwilling to 
return to … that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  Additionally, 
“a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy … shall 
be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political 
opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B).   
 
Dong can demonstrate a well-founded fear of future 
persecution by showing that she “has a genuine fear, and that 
a reasonable person in [her] circumstances would fear 
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persecution” upon return to her native country.  Gao v. 
Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 2002).  Her well-
founded fear must be both subjectively and objectively 
reasonable.  Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 177 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Dong‟s subjective fear can be shown through credible 
testimony that she fears persecution.  See Chang v. INS, 119 
F.3d 1055, 1066 (3d Cir. 1997).  Objective reasonableness 
may be established by, among other things, her own 
testimony, the testimony of other corroborating witnesses, or 
submitting evidence regarding conditions in her home 
country.  See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (“The testimony of the 
applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden 
of proof without corroboration.”).  
 
Dong‟s plea for withholding of removal requires her to 
establish that, upon returning to her native country, her “life 
or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the 
alien‟s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.”  INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3).  To receive the grant of withholding, the alien 
must establish a “clear probability” (or that it is more likely 
than not) that the alien would suffer persecution if repatriated.  
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 
(1984).  Unlike asylum, withholding of removal is mandatory 
rather than discretionary.  See Id. at 423.   
 
Dong‟s final claim arises out of Article III of the CAT, 
for which relief is available to applicants “where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture.”  The Foreign Affairs Reform 
and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105- 277, § 2242, 
112 Stat. 2681 (1999); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(1)-(2).  Relief 
under CAT exists in the form of withholding of removal to 
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the country of torture.  8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) .  CAT claims 
require the alien to “establish that it is more likely than not 
that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed 
country of removal.”  § 208.16(c)(2).  In assessing the 
potential of torture, the IJ must consider “all evidence 
relevant to the possibility of future torture,” along with 
evidence of “past torture inflicted upon the applicant,” and 
the likelihood that an applicant could “relocate to a part of the 
country of removal where he or she is not likely to be 
tortured.”  § 208.16(c)(3).    
 
Issue Of Corroboration
1
 
 
Before us, Dong argues that the BIA erred in requiring 
her husband‟s testimony as corroboration of her claim 
because it is both unnecessary and unreasonable.  She urges 
that, since her husband was in the United States at the time of 
the abortion in 1997, his statement, or misstatement, on the 
subject was nothing more than hearsay, and of limited 
relevance.  She also argues that his testimony pales in 
significance to the other probative evidence she has offered.  
Dong reasons that the other evidence of record – specifically, 
the letter from her mother-in-law, the abortion certificate, her 
husband‟s parole and travel documents, and the United States 
medical documentation – is much more persuasive than her 
husband‟s testimony would be.  Dong also insists that it is 
unreasonable for the BIA to require her husband‟s 
                                                          
1
 Based on the standard of review, which requires that we 
review both the BIA‟s and the IJ‟s opinions on this matter, we 
will reference the BIA‟s opinion when discussing the 
situation generally, and reference the IJ‟s opinion when 
necessary.  See Sandie, 562 F.3d at 250. 
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corroboration in light of the outstanding exclusion order 
entered against him,
 2
 and that her husband’s assertion in his 
claim should not be determinative of her credibility.  Though 
we share some of Dong‟s concerns regarding the relevance of 
her husband‟s testimony, we need not address them 
specifically, as we find that the IJ and the BIA erred by 
misapplying the law regarding when corroboration is 
necessary in order to meet one‟s burden of proof. 
 
 In Abdulai we vacated a BIA order which found that a 
Nigerian man failed to meet his burden for asylum due to a 
lack of certain corroborating evidence.  239 F.3d at 555.  We 
held that it is appropriate for the BIA to “require otherwise-
credible applicants to supply corroborating evidence in order 
to meet their burden of proof” when it is reasonable to expect 
such evidence to be produced.
 3
  Id. at 551.  Our definition of 
reasonable in this context is “where the facts [requiring 
corroboration] are central to the applicant‟s claim and easily 
subject to verification.”  Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 
192 (3d Cir. 2007).  In Abdulai, we approved of the three-step 
inquiry utilized by the BIA when considering the need for 
                                                          
2
 Le Ju Jian‟s status is subject to a final order of exclusion 
with a denied motion to reopen dated July 24, 2006. 
 
3
 The REAL ID Act of 2005, although inapplicable to the 
current situation because it only applies to asylum 
applications filed after May 11, 2005, codified the standard 
we adopted in Abdulai.  8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(1)(B) (“Where the 
trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide 
evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such 
evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have 
the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”). 
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corroboration.  239 F.3d at 554.  We held that the IJ can find 
that a petitioner‟s failure to produce corroborating evidence is 
fatal, but only after following the three-step inquiry, which 
requires: 
 
(1) an identification of the facts for which “it is 
reasonable to expect corroboration;” (2) an 
inquiry as to whether the applicant has provided 
information corroborating the relevant facts; 
and, if he or she has not, (3) an analysis of 
whether the applicant has adequately explained 
his or her failure to do so.  
Id. at 554 (quoting In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (BIA 
1997)).  This inquiry also requires that an applicant be given 
the opportunity to produce the corroborating evidence.  Id.  In 
Abdulai we vacated the BIA‟s order and remanded for further 
proceedings because the IJ failed to perform the first step of 
the inquiry, namely, to identify “what particular aspects of 
[the applicant‟s] testimony it would have been reasonable to 
expect him to have corroborated.”  239 F.3d at 554.     
 
We have required faithful adherence to the three-prong 
test.  In Chukwu v. Attorney General, we remanded the BIA‟s 
determination that Chukwu, a Nigerian, failed to meet his 
burden of proof for an asylum claim that was based on a fear 
of persecution due to his membership in MASSOB – the 
Movement for the Actualization for the Sovereign State of 
Biafra.  484 F.3d at 193.  In that case, as in Abdulai, the IJ 
failed to give sufficient notice to the applicant of the need to 
corroborate his claim of being a member of MASSOB – the 
first requirement of the Abdulai inquiry – and, therefore, did 
not give the applicant the opportunity to supply evidence that 
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would have satisfied his burden.  Id.  Conversely, in Sandie v. 
Attorney General, we upheld the IJ‟s denial of a Sierra Leone 
native‟s application for asylum due to a failure to corroborate.  
562 F.3d at 254.  In doing so, we stated that the IJ adequately 
performed the Abdulai inquiry: giving notice to the applicant 
of the facts requiring corroboration, offering ample 
opportunity to supply corroboration, and thoroughly 
reviewing, on the record, the evidence offered to corroborate 
prior to concluding that he failed to meet his burden.  Id. at 
253.  Here, however, we conclude that, unlike in Sandie, the 
IJ – in focusing solely on the absence of corroboration 
regarding Jian‟s statement about an alleged forced abortion in 
1992 in denying Dong‟s claim – failed to follow the steps 
required by Abdulai. 
 
The essence of Dong‟s claim, as the IJ highlighted in 
the initial proceedings, is Dong‟s allegation that she was 
forced by officials to abort a pregnancy in her native China in 
1997.  We presume that the IJ believed that it was reasonable 
to have corroboration of the fact of the forced abortion in 
1997, and we have little difficulty in finding that it was 
reasonable for him to have this expectation.  Dong offered 
corroboration of this fact by producing, among other things, 
the letter from her mother-in-law, the special disease 
certificate from Guantow Central Community Hospital, her 
medical records from her doctors‟ visits here in the United 
States, and her husband‟s parole and travel documents from 
his trip to China in 1996.  The IJ and the BIA failed to 
consider whether this evidence satisfied step (2) under 
Abdulai, that is, whether it corroborated her claim that she 
was forced to undergo an abortion in 1997 when she was 
seven months pregnant.  Rather, the IJ and the BIA found that 
because there was a question raised by the statement in Jian‟s 
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application, there was a need to specifically corroborate her 
story with his testimony or an affidavit from her husband.  
Without this “corroboration,” the BIA concluded that Dong 
failed to meet her burden of proof.   
 
In his opinion, the IJ reasoned that Dong‟s husband 
was a “star witness” who could shed light on the conflict 
between the two applications.  While his affidavit may have 
cleared up the misunderstanding, we think the focus on this 
particular evidence as “corroborating” and required under our 
jurisprudence was misplaced.  First, corroborating evidence is 
required if needed to prove a fact, and if it is “central” to 
one‟s claim.  Chukwu, 484 F.3d at 192.  If Dong‟s claim is 
that she was forced to have an abortion in 1997 when Jian 
was not present in China, how is Jian‟s testimony about that 
event necessary, let alone “central” to Dong‟s claim?  The 
situation would be different if Jian had been in China at that 
time and his application contained a direct inconsistency 
regarding what occurred in 1997.  But that is not the case.  
Moreover, how is his explanation as to what occurred in 1992 
either “central” or “corroborating” as to events that occurred 
five years later, in 1997?  We, thus, question the 
characterization of Jian‟s missing evidence as “corroborating” 
the fact in question. 
 
Even more important, had the IJ properly followed the 
three-step Abdulai inquiry, the IJ would have reasoned 
through the main issue – whether or not Dong met her burden 
of proof in her asylum application.  As noted above, the IJ did 
satisfy step one of the inquiry by pointing to the facts 
surrounding the alleged forced abortion as those that would 
require corroboration.  But the IJ then muddied the waters by 
shifting his focus away from whether Dong actually 
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“provided information corroborating the relevant facts” 
concerning the alleged forced abortion in 1997.  Abdulai at 
554.  Instead, the IJ dwelled on what her husband‟s 
explanation would be as to what occurred in 1992 and why 
Dong did not produce him to explain himself.  The IJ 
concluded that Dong‟s failure to produce an affidavit from 
her husband – deemed necessary “corroboration” by the IJ – 
defeated her claim.  We suggest that this is not what our 
precedent in Abdulai calls for.        
 
Abdulai typically comes into play when a petitioner 
has testified, apparently credibly, about the facts giving rise to 
her claim, but the IJ believes it would be “reasonable” for her 
to have corroboration of one or more facts, such that he 
imposes an obligation on her to produce corroboration in 
order to meet her burden.  The next step is to assess whether 
such corroborating evidence has been supplied.  If it is 
“reasonable” to expect corroboration of the fact to be 
produced – that is, such evidence is central and available – 
and it has been produced, Abdulai is satisfied.  As to 
corroboration not supplied, under step three, the IJ asks if the 
failure is satisfactorily explained.   
 
Here, step two was not performed at all.  The IJ should 
have weighed the Guantow Hospital certificate against the 
DHS report and addressed the relative merits of these 
documents.  The IJ should have evaluated the letters from 
Dong‟s family to gauge their corroborative value.  The IJ 
should have considered Dong‟s husband‟s parole and travel 
documents to see whether they explain his whereabouts in 
relation to Dong‟s assertions.  The IJ should also have 
reviewed Dong‟s United States medical records and 
considered whether the fact that Dong discussed her alleged 
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forced abortion with her doctors in the United States – when 
seeking medical care for the pregnancies that resulted in the 
birth of Dong‟s two youngest children – reflects favorably on 
whether this did in fact occur, and thus constitutes meaningful 
corroboration of her claim.  All of this evidence should be 
considered to gauge whether Dong met her burden to 
corroborate her testimony.   
 
The only aspect not “corroborated” was, we suggest, 
not really an issue of “corroboration” at all, but rather an 
explanation as to a statement made by her husband in his 
application about a forced abortion in 1992.  While the 
absence of explanation from her husband is perhaps 
perplexing, it does not amount to a lack of corroboration, nor 
does it undermine the force of any of the other specific 
corroborating evidence.  And while under step three we might 
question why Dong would fail to produce an explanation 
from her husband, we do know he was under a removal order 
and we can imagine a host of other possible reasons.  While 
the IJ seems to assume a wife can readily produce a statement 
from her husband, we suggest that is not necessarily an 
appropriate assumption,
4
 let alone a proper basis for an 
                                                          
4
 At the merits hearing, the IJ seemed to take issue with 
Dong‟s assertion that she only then learned about her 
husband‟s claim in his asylum application as to what occurred 
in 1992.  Dong repeatedly stated that she was not privy to 
information about her husband‟s asylum application and that 
the only way to get this information would be to ask her 
husband.  The record fails to show that the IJ considered any 
differences in Chinese cultural norms which may have 
informed her lack of knowledge and general reticence when 
discussing her relationship with her husband.  In Dia v. 
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adverse finding when other evidence has been offered to 
corroborate her version of events.  Accordingly, we will 
remand to the BIA to remand to the IJ for proper analysis of 
the evidence under Abdulai.      
 
Claims Of Persecution Upon Her Return To China 
 
 Dong also makes asylum, withholding of removal, and 
relief under CAT claims in her application based on a fear of 
future persecution and torture upon her return to China.  The 
BIA held that Dong failed to meet her burden of proof for 
these claims.  We agree.  
 
Dong argues that, under China‟s family planning 
policy, because she will return to China the mother of three, 
she will be subjected to forced sterilization or substantial 
monetary fines.  The BIA held that Dong failed to support 
these claims with enough evidence to meet her burden of 
proof.  After analyzing the evidence, the BIA determined that 
the evidence presented by Dong does not show any pattern or 
practice of persecution by Chinese officials of applicants on 
account of the birth of children in the United States.
5
  The 
BIA also reasoned that Dong‟s claim was unsuccessful 
                                                                                                                                  
Ashcroft, we commented on the error that an IJ makes in 
ignoring cultural differences in customs and communication 
when making credibility determinations.  353 F.3d 225, 276 
(3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) ( McKee, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
 
5
 In Liu v. U.S. Attorney General, after reviewing 
substantially similar evidence, we reached an identical 
conclusion.  555 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009); see also 
Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 185 (BIA 2007). 
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because: (1) she failed to show that Chinese officials were 
still looking for her; (2) Dong‟s documentation was general 
country condition information that failed to evince how 
potential persecution would specifically apply to her; and (3) 
Dong failed to provide any evidence at all that proved the 
potential of fines being levied against her.  In light of the 
substantial evidence standard of review that governs our 
analysis, we will not disturb the BIA‟s conclusions related to 
Dong‟s failure to meet her burden of proof for her claims 
based on a fear of future persecution.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the BIA‟s ruling as it 
relates to Dong‟s CAT claim and her asylum claim based on a 
fear of future persecution.  We will vacate the order denying 
Dong‟s application for asylum and withholding of removal 
based on past persecution, and we will remand this aspect of 
her claim to the BIA so it can be remanded to the IJ for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
